South of the James

by Conaway B. Haskins III

While African Americans have always played a role within the Republican Party, the GOP’s Southern Strategy coupled with skepticism of the Religious Right in the black community effectively shut the door to significant African American public participation in GOP circles in the last 30 years. While it is well-documented that large numbers of black Americans hold conservative views on political and social issues, black folks and Republicans seemed to be speaking in a different and often racially-divisive language. This situation has been discussed to a significant degree in the media and political circles, and some practical steps have been offered by a number of people. However, the results of the 2004 elections and the political environment that surrounds that election could point to the lowering of the wall that has separated blacks and Republicans.

Lost amid the excitement over the Democratic Party’s new star, Illinois Senator Barack Obama, was a well-placed speech at the summer 2004 Republican Party convention by Maryland’s Lt. Governor, Michael Steele. Steele, an African American lawyer who formerly served as the chairman and chief strategist for the Maryland GOP, gave a passionate and pointed presentation that directly took on the Democratic Party’s courtship and patronage of black voters. He elegantly managed to stay well within the realm of mainstream conservative Republicanism, while acknowledging the importance of African American culture in his life. Steele’s presence on the podium, coupled with a significant increase in GOP convention participation by African American delegates, signaled that a new day was arising in contemporary US politics. This represented the authentication of the black conservative as a political alternative in black America

The November presidential election – insightfully analyzed by Low Country’s Webster Brooks (see: “A Long Winter in Black America or a New Beginning?”) – witnessed President Bush showing improved electoral performance among black voters. Exit polls indicate that the President – who garnered a woefully low 8% of the 2000 black vote – actually increased his number and percentage of African American votes. Mr. Bush was most successful in gaining black votes in Ohio, with 16% of black voters supporting him. This increase of 7 percentage points arguably contributed a great deal to his winning Ohio’s critical electoral votes in a close statewide race. Bush’s efforts in that state were headed by Ohio’s African American Secretary of State, Ken Blackwell. Blackwell has been touted as the odds-on favorite to win the 2006 GOP gubernatorial nomination and the governor’s race. A popular and controversial figure, he is a leading black Republican and a principled conservative who has won white and black votes throughout his political career. He and Steele, who helped Bush increase his share of Maryland’s black votes by nearly 3%, appear to represent an emerging class of black Republicans, a group that may provide a legitimate alternative to the Democratic Party and the black left, allowing the GOP to compete for black votes on some level.

For his part, Mr. Bush has stocked his cabinet and election campaigns with a cadre of ethnic and racial minorities. Taking a cue page from the business world that diversity is good business, the president has made notable appointments, such as Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice. The President has also overseen the ascendance of black Republican politicos like former Education Secretary Rod Paige, FCC Chairman Michael Powell, and Bush family friend HUD Secretary Alphonso Jackson. Bush’s campaign was supported by a high profile group of black Wall Street executives, such as Stanley O’Neal and Dick Parsons, the CEOs of Merrill Lynch and Time Warner, respectively. Additionally, former Congressman J.C. Watts rose to the head of a major GOP political action committee, GOPAC, which raised funds for candidates in the fall elections.

This new generation of black conservatives offers an alternative to the stereotype of African American Republicans as self-hating, bombastic, and buffoonish characters. Black political figures such as Alan Keys and Armstrong Williams directly took on the black left and the Democrats with an aura of righteous indignation that seemingly appealed to white racists and true-blue conservatives. Their denigration of black popular culture, welfare moms, and the black left worked hand-in-hand with emergence of right-wing talk radio types, such as Rush Limbaugh. This kind of fire-breathing conservative turned off numbers of black voters, contributing to the fissure between them and the GOP. Fortunately for the American body politic, the public face of black Republicans seems to be shifting.

This new class of black Republicans has followed a somewhat different route. Coming from careers in academia, business, and grassroots political activism, their loyalty, ambition, and ability to speak the language of black voters and white conservatives alike, has opened the door for a new model of black conservatism. These black Republicans come across as concerned “next door neighbors” and friends versus partisan attack dogs. Steele, Blackwell and the others demonstrate that today’s black Republican can fully embrace the party while maintaining his or her sense of authentic “blackness.” What they have in common, aside from their politics, is an abiding faith in Republican principles and a comfortable sense of black cultural identity.

The result is that black voters may finally have alternatives to the Democratic Party and the black left for political leadership. This is sorely needed in order to diversify black politics and help the African American community raise its political maturity. With a cadre of talented folks like Steele and Blackwell, along with scores of others throughout the nation with lower profiles but higher expectations, the emerging black Republicans and conservatives remain positioned to usher in the gradual transformation of African American politics into a multi-party democracy.

The author is a nonprofit executive and freelance writer based in Chesterfield, VA.

By Conaway B. Haskins III

Black Athlete Sports Network, December 27, 2004

It looks like professional baseball is back on in the Nation’s capital now that a new deal has been struck between the D.C. city council, Mayor Anthony Williams, and Major League Baseball. This news followed gloom-and-doom reports that baseball was on the verge of pulling out of Washington and exploring relocating the Expos – now named the Nationals – to a new city. Somehow, the factions were able to work out a deal that was amenable to each, and in the end, this entire mess was all much ado about nothing. An unfortunate element to this escapade has been the injection of the race issue into the effort, along with its companion issue, class. More than with many other U.S. cities, nearly every public issue that arises in D.C. is fraught with racial elements.

MLB’s impending move there is no different. D.C. is a Black-majority city, a magnet for young Black professionals, and it is surrounded by mostly White-majority suburbs. The city also has the misfortune of being a federal territory, and thus, it lacks basic political rights and controls that no other cities in the 50 states lack.

Having served as center for American Black life, the D.C.’s sports history includes a Negro League team (i.e., Homestead Grays, Baltimore Elite Giants, Baltimore Black Sox) and a number of prominent players, such as Hall of Fame slugger Josh Gibson, who notably spent time in the city’s historic mental hospital – St. Elizabeth’s.

Therefore, in order to fully understand what went down in this most recent incarnation of MLB in D.C., it’s necessary to look through the prism of race. After the city council seemingly nullified the original deal that was on the table, baseball officials responded that the terms were unacceptable. City council chairwoman Linda Cropp, who initially supported the mayor but then began backing away from his deal, was vilified in and out of the city by baseball supporters, some of whom used overtly racist language – references to “jungle monkeys” and the like – to express their displeasure.

Others used more coded, but just as dangerous rhetoric. In the midst of this, Cropp gained support in many corners of the city, but for divergent reasons. This kind of racial bickering is not new to D.C. Mayor Tony Williams has long faced criticism in the city’s poorer and Blacker sections as being out of touch with their communities. He has been taken to task by some in the local media as not being “Black enough.”

As suspect as this claim is, some local conspiracy theorists – a good portion of the city’s population – further asserted that Williams’ actions were aimed at enriching the city’s White business and political classes, the folks whom they feel put him in office.

Thinking of this nature has become the mayor’s Achilles heel despite the fact that he has successfully shepherded his adopted hometown through a dramatic physical and economic resurgence, raising the profile and enhancing the image of the entire city.

Bringing MLB back to D.C. after a 33-year absence was to be a win-win situation for Tony Williams because the stadium is to be built in the heart of heavily-Black and poor Southeast Washington. After wrangling over the location, the Mayor played his trump card and billed the new baseball facility as the centerpiece of his initiative to revitalize this long-neglected city corridor.

Last minute additions to the original baseball deal spoke to community investment and engagement as a part of the project. However, from the outset, fears that this outreach was mere lip service were confirmed by sources in D.C. government who pointed out that key players working in community development in the Southeast Washington corridor were mostly uninvolved with the baseball situation. However, those sources say that it’s “inevitable that [they] will be called in at some point.”

Other government officials who work closely with the city’s business community say that many local firms in the “city’s most affluent section[s]” are not willing to “fall over for baseball…some businesses have thought about relocating [to the suburbs] rather than shell out the business tax.

They have good reason to question the citywide tax, because the stadium in Southeast will do nothing for them in terms of increased business, ” even it is an overall good thing for the city. Media reports indicate that citizens in the more affluent and White neighborhoods are lukewarm to the entire deal, if not in outright opposition to it.

The latest council vote reflects this. It is telling that the 6 members who voted against the plan either were either White Republicans (including a former Republican who is now an independent) who serve at-large, or Black and White members representing heavily White and wealthy constituents. The seven who voted in favor were at-large Black Democrats and their allies (White and Black) who represent districts with significant ethnic constituencies. Several council members, on both sides of the stadium issue, are purportedly angling to position themselves as candidates in the next mayoral election.

Another racial element to the equation was the criticism that the proposed $500 million-plus bond would only serve baseball and its White-dominated suburban consumer base. Cropp reported that her office was deluged with negative phone calls from the “703” and “301” area codes, referring to heavily White Fairfax County, Virginia and Montgomery County, Maryland, two of the richest municipalities in the country.

Those same suburbanites are constantly accused of coming into D.C. for play and work, but then taking their high incomes – and the subsequent taxes that those incomes generate for Virginia and Maryland – back home with them. Residents of D.C. who opposed the original deal felt that the large public financing of the stadium project would take away available bond money from other purposes, such as education, human services and public works, for the majority Black population.

While this argument assumes that the city would eventually issue bonds for this purpose – a highly unlikely occurrence – the $500 million dollar figure was too much for many to fathom. This is exacerbated by the vaunted “structural deficit” that D.C. faces as a result of the city taking on both state and local administrative responsibilities, unlike any other America city. Having a private investor on board would theoretically help reduce the debt burden that the city would incur for baseball.

According to sources inside D.C. government, city council took action to restore a sense of balance to the deal and better suit the city. Members felt that the mayor had given away too much to baseball, and left the city with a power imbalance. Cropp decided to pull her support for the initial deal in order to gain some leverage over baseball.

The specter of Marion Barry also factored in because the newly-reelected councilman represents the baseballs team’s home area in Southeast Washington, and he went on the record as an opponent to public funding for baseball. Sensing this, Cropp put out a new proposal that included a requirement that the deal be funding through greater private sources for up to 50% of the costs. Baseball immediately reacted to this as a deal-breaker, but as of late, it backed down.

Sources inside the city government assert that Cropp would not “have made the proposal for 50% private financing of the stadium if she didn’t have someone already in mind.” Apparently, the council sought to spur the kind of deal that created the MCI Arena for the Washington Bullets/Wizards NBA franchise, where team owner Abe Pollin covered a significant portion of the costs.

Some suggested that council had BET founder and current owner of the NBA Charlotte Bobcats, Bob Johnson, in mind as the private financier because “Johnson offered to finance the building of the MCI center when Abe Pollin wanted to city to finance the entire project…Although he has his hands full with the Bobcats, Linda Cropp may be trying to create a similar situation, maybe with another financier.”

Currently, there are several ownership groups bidding for the team, and this crew includes business types from Virginia, Washington and New York. Thus, an ownership group from outside of the city could emerge victorious. By forcing MLB to deal with a private stadium investor, city council is essentially hedging its bets to retain some level of control over baseball matters to D.C.-based interests.

Otherwise, if the city is on the dole for the entire stadium amount, the city could risk losing the team to another region, or Northern Virginia, in the future unless a lease that is very favorable to the city can be arranged. A private investor or group of private investors would most likely include a number of minority partners, such as Bob Johnson or the recently fired head of Fannie Mae, Franklin Raines, who is now a member of a prospective ownership group.

In the end, despite their protestations, MLB may actually benefit from the new deal in the long run. If a private investor emerges, then the city government would have to give up some of its authority over baseball matters. This means that the fortunes of the Nationals would be less subject to the ebbs and flows of local political gamesmanship. Clearly, elected officials serve as the major source of institutional accountability for decision-making processes involving public funding through taxation or bonding. In a city like Washington, where public services are still lacking and poverty is pressing, the exercise of political leadership such as by Chairwoman Cropp is a good thing.

However, if part of this private investor matter is merely political one-upmanship between the mayor and council, or if it is geared to line the pockets of specific groups of individuals, then caution is needed by baseball and the citizenry. This kind of thing is an unseemly reality of urban politics, especially in a Black-majority city. It would be wise for all involved to understand that when you seek to spread the benefits of this kind of project around, one important group can never be left out – the citizens. It would truly be a shame for the citizenry to be divided, Black from White, rich from poor, simply because too many people are green with envy.

By Conaway B. Haskins III

Black Athlete Sports Network, December 24, 2004

Less than two weeks after Notre Dame fired him, the University of Washington snapped up Tyrone Willingham for its head coaching spot. A top-notch West Coast public university, Washington has anointed the coach as the savior of its downtrodden football program. Washington won only one game this past season and has dealt with a coaching controversy in recent years. However, it remains a premier spot, one which has made history by having Black men simultaneously run its major conference football and basketball programs. Given his history on the field, Husky fans would be wise to not look upon the 50 year-old coach as its football messiah. If this happens, Willingham, college football’s highest profile Black coach, could be in for a long ride.

Off the field, few major college coaches have academic records as impressive as Willingham. A scholar-athlete at Michigan State, he held head coaching positions at two highly-regarded universities. Stanford has long been ranked among the top 5 or 10 universities by US News & World Report, and Notre Dame is typically in the top 25. At both schools, Willingham’s football teams either continued a pattern of high GPAs and graduation rates, or saw improvements in both.

He was particularly effective – and widely lauded – for his role in raising the classroom and graduation achievements of Black football players to the same levels as their White teammates. In taking the helm of the football program at a Top 50 university, Willingham’s history indicates that the Huskies will be a juggernaut off the field.

Still, the reality is that college football is a business with a bottom line of winning on Saturdays. More wins translates into BCS bowl bids, higher ticket sales, and increased TV revenues. His shortcomings on the field drove his dismissal at Notre Dame, and in this all-important department, the reality of Tyrone Willingham’s coaching record does not quite measure up to the legend that surrounds him.

In ten seasons as a head coach, Willingham compiled a record of 65-51-1 (55.6%), with 6 bowl invitations. He coached in five bowls and won only one, the 1996 Sun Bowl. His 2004 Notre Dame squad earned a sixth invitation, but he won’t be coaching in that game. He’s had one season each with 8, 9, and 10 wins, and he could never put together three consecutive winning seasons. Willingham produced only three top 25 teams, two at Stanford and one at Notre Dame, and his highest poll ranking is 16^th. A Tyrone Willingham team, though competitive, can be expected to go 7-5, receive a bowl invitation and lose.

In the high-stakes game of college football, performing like this is not bad. However, it’s merely above average in a world where that is just not good enough. Two coaches with similar records – Frank Solich and Ron Zook – learned this lesson the hard way. Like him, they were fired while still under contract after leaving far too many alumni, athletic directors, and boosters, under whelmed on Saturday afternoons. Granted, the current Notre Dame program is not the Fighting Irish of Lou Holtz. Still, the programs that Solich and Zook inherited, at Nebraska and Florida respectively, were not on par with the respective dynasties that preceded them.

Fair or not, that’s the nature of the college game – coaches pay the price for underachieving teams. Coach Willingham is well aware of this, and he must do what he can to ensure that his teams are far above average; they must be great.

Washington has a solid football tradition, having won a national championship in 1991 and tied for the Pac-10 title in 2000. Coach Willingham has a good record and high expectations for himself. While the Husky football program is not quite on the level with Michigan, Miami, Ohio State, and yes, Notre Dame, Washington has a strong academic and athletic heritage, along with the resources to compete with those schools. As such, at Washington, Coach Willingham must actually live up to his own legend – on the field.

This time around, producing 7-5 teams with no bowl wins is just not a viable option for him in the Pacific Northwest. He had his shots at Stanford and Notre Dame, and the results were mixed at best. While he won’t be expected to win a national title every year, Coach Willingham must guide his teams to Pac-10 conference titles, BCS bowls, national title games, and high classroom performance.

The man, the myth and the legend must become one. Otherwise, he’ll simply be just another good football coach, not the great coach in whom many high hopes rest.

By Conaway B. Haskins III

Black Athlete Sports Network, December 12, 2004

As the 2004 NFL season comes to a close, it would be wise for the sports world to reflect on the status of black coaches at football’s highest level. Given the recent controversies in the college game that have raised the ire of black coaches and their allies, we should all take a step back and examine an interesting fact of NFL coaching life – the clear success of black coaches in terms of wins and losses.

Art Shell made history in 1989 when Al Davis promoted him to head coach after his long tenure as a player and coach with the team. Shell was followed into the NFL by Dennis Green, Ray Rhodes, Tony Dungy, Herman Edwards, Marvin Lewis and, the newest member of the coaching fraternity, Lovie Smith.

Let us not forget current Browns coach, Terry Robiskie, he being the man who’s been asked to finish out the seasons of two different fired coaches. In my mind, Ray Rhodes should receive special recognition as the first black man to be hired for a head coaching spot after being fired from one, thus starting a black coach reemployment trend that has extended to Tony Dungy and Dennis Green.

Aside from their membership in the black race, one other important fact unites them all. As a group, these men have won a higher percentage of their games than the NFL average coach, typically a white coach. According to the latest data, there have been 255 men who have coached NFL-level teams. This includes the AFL, which merged with the NFL in the 1970 after serving as a rival to the league for players and media attention. Of course, there were many coaches who worked in the league before 1950, but the most accurate statistics cover the last 50 years.

Overall, the NFL’s coaches have achieved an overall record of 10,456-10,207-348 in regular season games, and a 390-390 playoff record. Out of those 255, only eight African Americans (3.1% of the total) have risen through the ranks to reach the head coach spot. Entering Week 14’s games, the NFL’s black coaches have achieved an overall regular season record of 331-255-1 (56.4%). Over a combined total of 40 full seasons, they have guided their teams to 21 playoff appearances in 32 full seasons, for a 12-21 record or 36.4%.

Despite these not-so-great post-season win totals, black coaches have appeared in 5 conference championship games since 1989, coming close to Super Bowl berths on several occasions. In comparison, the 246 White men who have coached NFL teams are 10,028-9, 865-346. This pans out to a regular season winning percentage of 49.5%. White coaches do fare better in the playoffs with a combined 371-367 record (50.3%), which is logically in line with the average playoff performance since there is a 1 to 1 win-loss ratio.

Essentially, this indicates that, on balance, a white coach has only a 50-50 shot at having a winning record. But, a Black coach is more likely than not to win more games than he loses. It is not my intent to demonstrate that black men are better coaches than white men, but the evidence does show that the ability of African-American to win in the NFL is clear.

Despite this, only 12 teams in history have given a black man a chance to be their head coach, and only 10 have actually hired black men as head coaches (Robiskie was twice brought on as an assistant and promoted in-season). If Vince Lombardi was right about winning being the only thing that matters, then NFL teams should open up the flood gates to welcome black coaching talent.

On the contrary, the league has had to institute a policy that essentially forces NFL teams who are looking for new coaches to pay lip service, at a minimum, to black candidates. While this action does have some residual benefits in terms of raising the profile of selected black prospects league-wide and giving them the opportunity to gain key interview experience, it hasn’t yet produced a flood of hires, say, on par with the NBA.

In my mind, and according to their data, no one can really make any other argument for why there aren’t more black coaches in the NFL other than to site the lingering effects of historical discrimination and the continuing presence of institutional racism with the NFL’s team executive suites. Given that the NCAA is down to 2 black coaches, bringing candidates up through that pipeline is probably not a great option. Plus, given the recent history of coaches who tried to make the transition from the college game to the pro ranks (e.g. Steve Spurrier, Butch Davis, etc.), this is probably not a bad thing.

While Paul Tagliabue and the NFL’s executive team must be commended for taking progressive steps toward opening up opportunity for black coaches through its Minority Coaching Fellowship and other efforts, the leagues’ team owners should be continuously taken to task for not sealing the deal with hiring black coaches.

After all, if the worst thing that can happen is that the brother turns out to be average, the records show that it’s not so bad after all.