South of the James

by Conaway B. Haskins III

While African Americans have always played a role within the Republican Party, the GOP’s Southern Strategy coupled with skepticism of the Religious Right in the black community effectively shut the door to significant African American public participation in GOP circles in the last 30 years. While it is well-documented that large numbers of black Americans hold conservative views on political and social issues, black folks and Republicans seemed to be speaking in a different and often racially-divisive language. This situation has been discussed to a significant degree in the media and political circles, and some practical steps have been offered by a number of people. However, the results of the 2004 elections and the political environment that surrounds that election could point to the lowering of the wall that has separated blacks and Republicans.

Lost amid the excitement over the Democratic Party’s new star, Illinois Senator Barack Obama, was a well-placed speech at the summer 2004 Republican Party convention by Maryland’s Lt. Governor, Michael Steele. Steele, an African American lawyer who formerly served as the chairman and chief strategist for the Maryland GOP, gave a passionate and pointed presentation that directly took on the Democratic Party’s courtship and patronage of black voters. He elegantly managed to stay well within the realm of mainstream conservative Republicanism, while acknowledging the importance of African American culture in his life. Steele’s presence on the podium, coupled with a significant increase in GOP convention participation by African American delegates, signaled that a new day was arising in contemporary US politics. This represented the authentication of the black conservative as a political alternative in black America

The November presidential election – insightfully analyzed by Low Country’s Webster Brooks (see: “A Long Winter in Black America or a New Beginning?”) – witnessed President Bush showing improved electoral performance among black voters. Exit polls indicate that the President – who garnered a woefully low 8% of the 2000 black vote – actually increased his number and percentage of African American votes. Mr. Bush was most successful in gaining black votes in Ohio, with 16% of black voters supporting him. This increase of 7 percentage points arguably contributed a great deal to his winning Ohio’s critical electoral votes in a close statewide race. Bush’s efforts in that state were headed by Ohio’s African American Secretary of State, Ken Blackwell. Blackwell has been touted as the odds-on favorite to win the 2006 GOP gubernatorial nomination and the governor’s race. A popular and controversial figure, he is a leading black Republican and a principled conservative who has won white and black votes throughout his political career. He and Steele, who helped Bush increase his share of Maryland’s black votes by nearly 3%, appear to represent an emerging class of black Republicans, a group that may provide a legitimate alternative to the Democratic Party and the black left, allowing the GOP to compete for black votes on some level.

For his part, Mr. Bush has stocked his cabinet and election campaigns with a cadre of ethnic and racial minorities. Taking a cue page from the business world that diversity is good business, the president has made notable appointments, such as Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice. The President has also overseen the ascendance of black Republican politicos like former Education Secretary Rod Paige, FCC Chairman Michael Powell, and Bush family friend HUD Secretary Alphonso Jackson. Bush’s campaign was supported by a high profile group of black Wall Street executives, such as Stanley O’Neal and Dick Parsons, the CEOs of Merrill Lynch and Time Warner, respectively. Additionally, former Congressman J.C. Watts rose to the head of a major GOP political action committee, GOPAC, which raised funds for candidates in the fall elections.

This new generation of black conservatives offers an alternative to the stereotype of African American Republicans as self-hating, bombastic, and buffoonish characters. Black political figures such as Alan Keys and Armstrong Williams directly took on the black left and the Democrats with an aura of righteous indignation that seemingly appealed to white racists and true-blue conservatives. Their denigration of black popular culture, welfare moms, and the black left worked hand-in-hand with emergence of right-wing talk radio types, such as Rush Limbaugh. This kind of fire-breathing conservative turned off numbers of black voters, contributing to the fissure between them and the GOP. Fortunately for the American body politic, the public face of black Republicans seems to be shifting.

This new class of black Republicans has followed a somewhat different route. Coming from careers in academia, business, and grassroots political activism, their loyalty, ambition, and ability to speak the language of black voters and white conservatives alike, has opened the door for a new model of black conservatism. These black Republicans come across as concerned “next door neighbors” and friends versus partisan attack dogs. Steele, Blackwell and the others demonstrate that today’s black Republican can fully embrace the party while maintaining his or her sense of authentic “blackness.” What they have in common, aside from their politics, is an abiding faith in Republican principles and a comfortable sense of black cultural identity.

The result is that black voters may finally have alternatives to the Democratic Party and the black left for political leadership. This is sorely needed in order to diversify black politics and help the African American community raise its political maturity. With a cadre of talented folks like Steele and Blackwell, along with scores of others throughout the nation with lower profiles but higher expectations, the emerging black Republicans and conservatives remain positioned to usher in the gradual transformation of African American politics into a multi-party democracy.

The author is a nonprofit executive and freelance writer based in Chesterfield, VA.

By Conaway B. Haskins III

Black Athlete Sports Network, December 27, 2004

It looks like professional baseball is back on in the Nation’s capital now that a new deal has been struck between the D.C. city council, Mayor Anthony Williams, and Major League Baseball. This news followed gloom-and-doom reports that baseball was on the verge of pulling out of Washington and exploring relocating the Expos – now named the Nationals - to a new city. Somehow, the factions were able to work out a deal that was amenable to each, and in the end, this entire mess was all much ado about nothing. An unfortunate element to this escapade has been the injection of the race issue into the effort, along with its companion issue, class. More than with many other U.S. cities, nearly every public issue that arises in D.C. is fraught with racial elements.

MLB’s impending move there is no different. D.C. is a Black-majority city, a magnet for young Black professionals, and it is surrounded by mostly White-majority suburbs. The city also has the misfortune of being a federal territory, and thus, it lacks basic political rights and controls that no other cities in the 50 states lack.

Having served as center for American Black life, the D.C.’s sports history includes a Negro League team (i.e., Homestead Grays, Baltimore Elite Giants, Baltimore Black Sox) and a number of prominent players, such as Hall of Fame slugger Josh Gibson, who notably spent time in the city’s historic mental hospital – St. Elizabeth’s.

Therefore, in order to fully understand what went down in this most recent incarnation of MLB in D.C., it’s necessary to look through the prism of race. After the city council seemingly nullified the original deal that was on the table, baseball officials responded that the terms were unacceptable. City council chairwoman Linda Cropp, who initially supported the mayor but then began backing away from his deal, was vilified in and out of the city by baseball supporters, some of whom used overtly racist language - references to “jungle monkeys” and the like – to express their displeasure.

Others used more coded, but just as dangerous rhetoric. In the midst of this, Cropp gained support in many corners of the city, but for divergent reasons. This kind of racial bickering is not new to D.C. Mayor Tony Williams has long faced criticism in the city’s poorer and Blacker sections as being out of touch with their communities. He has been taken to task by some in the local media as not being “Black enough.”

As suspect as this claim is, some local conspiracy theorists - a good portion of the city’s population – further asserted that Williams’ actions were aimed at enriching the city’s White business and political classes, the folks whom they feel put him in office.

Thinking of this nature has become the mayor’s Achilles heel despite the fact that he has successfully shepherded his adopted hometown through a dramatic physical and economic resurgence, raising the profile and enhancing the image of the entire city.

Bringing MLB back to D.C. after a 33-year absence was to be a win-win situation for Tony Williams because the stadium is to be built in the heart of heavily-Black and poor Southeast Washington. After wrangling over the location, the Mayor played his trump card and billed the new baseball facility as the centerpiece of his initiative to revitalize this long-neglected city corridor.

Last minute additions to the original baseball deal spoke to community investment and engagement as a part of the project. However, from the outset, fears that this outreach was mere lip service were confirmed by sources in D.C. government who pointed out that key players working in community development in the Southeast Washington corridor were mostly uninvolved with the baseball situation. However, those sources say that it’s “inevitable that [they] will be called in at some point.”

Other government officials who work closely with the city’s business community say that many local firms in the “city’s most affluent section[s]” are not willing to “fall over for baseball…some businesses have thought about relocating [to the suburbs] rather than shell out the business tax.

They have good reason to question the citywide tax, because the stadium in Southeast will do nothing for them in terms of increased business, ” even it is an overall good thing for the city. Media reports indicate that citizens in the more affluent and White neighborhoods are lukewarm to the entire deal, if not in outright opposition to it.

The latest council vote reflects this. It is telling that the 6 members who voted against the plan either were either White Republicans (including a former Republican who is now an independent) who serve at-large, or Black and White members representing heavily White and wealthy constituents. The seven who voted in favor were at-large Black Democrats and their allies (White and Black) who represent districts with significant ethnic constituencies. Several council members, on both sides of the stadium issue, are purportedly angling to position themselves as candidates in the next mayoral election.

Another racial element to the equation was the criticism that the proposed $500 million-plus bond would only serve baseball and its White-dominated suburban consumer base. Cropp reported that her office was deluged with negative phone calls from the “703” and “301” area codes, referring to heavily White Fairfax County, Virginia and Montgomery County, Maryland, two of the richest municipalities in the country.

Those same suburbanites are constantly accused of coming into D.C. for play and work, but then taking their high incomes - and the subsequent taxes that those incomes generate for Virginia and Maryland - back home with them. Residents of D.C. who opposed the original deal felt that the large public financing of the stadium project would take away available bond money from other purposes, such as education, human services and public works, for the majority Black population.

While this argument assumes that the city would eventually issue bonds for this purpose - a highly unlikely occurrence - the $500 million dollar figure was too much for many to fathom. This is exacerbated by the vaunted “structural deficit” that D.C. faces as a result of the city taking on both state and local administrative responsibilities, unlike any other America city. Having a private investor on board would theoretically help reduce the debt burden that the city would incur for baseball.

According to sources inside D.C. government, city council took action to restore a sense of balance to the deal and better suit the city. Members felt that the mayor had given away too much to baseball, and left the city with a power imbalance. Cropp decided to pull her support for the initial deal in order to gain some leverage over baseball.

The specter of Marion Barry also factored in because the newly-reelected councilman represents the baseballs team’s home area in Southeast Washington, and he went on the record as an opponent to public funding for baseball. Sensing this, Cropp put out a new proposal that included a requirement that the deal be funding through greater private sources for up to 50% of the costs. Baseball immediately reacted to this as a deal-breaker, but as of late, it backed down.

Sources inside the city government assert that Cropp would not “have made the proposal for 50% private financing of the stadium if she didn’t have someone already in mind.” Apparently, the council sought to spur the kind of deal that created the MCI Arena for the Washington Bullets/Wizards NBA franchise, where team owner Abe Pollin covered a significant portion of the costs.

Some suggested that council had BET founder and current owner of the NBA Charlotte Bobcats, Bob Johnson, in mind as the private financier because “Johnson offered to finance the building of the MCI center when Abe Pollin wanted to city to finance the entire project…Although he has his hands full with the Bobcats, Linda Cropp may be trying to create a similar situation, maybe with another financier.”

Currently, there are several ownership groups bidding for the team, and this crew includes business types from Virginia, Washington and New York. Thus, an ownership group from outside of the city could emerge victorious. By forcing MLB to deal with a private stadium investor, city council is essentially hedging its bets to retain some level of control over baseball matters to D.C.-based interests.

Otherwise, if the city is on the dole for the entire stadium amount, the city could risk losing the team to another region, or Northern Virginia, in the future unless a lease that is very favorable to the city can be arranged. A private investor or group of private investors would most likely include a number of minority partners, such as Bob Johnson or the recently fired head of Fannie Mae, Franklin Raines, who is now a member of a prospective ownership group.

In the end, despite their protestations, MLB may actually benefit from the new deal in the long run. If a private investor emerges, then the city government would have to give up some of its authority over baseball matters. This means that the fortunes of the Nationals would be less subject to the ebbs and flows of local political gamesmanship. Clearly, elected officials serve as the major source of institutional accountability for decision-making processes involving public funding through taxation or bonding. In a city like Washington, where public services are still lacking and poverty is pressing, the exercise of political leadership such as by Chairwoman Cropp is a good thing.

However, if part of this private investor matter is merely political one-upmanship between the mayor and council, or if it is geared to line the pockets of specific groups of individuals, then caution is needed by baseball and the citizenry. This kind of thing is an unseemly reality of urban politics, especially in a Black-majority city. It would be wise for all involved to understand that when you seek to spread the benefits of this kind of project around, one important group can never be left out - the citizens. It would truly be a shame for the citizenry to be divided, Black from White, rich from poor, simply because too many people are green with envy.

By Conaway B. Haskins III

Black Athlete Sports Network, December 24, 2004

Less than two weeks after Notre Dame fired him, the University of Washington snapped up Tyrone Willingham for its head coaching spot. A top-notch West Coast public university, Washington has anointed the coach as the savior of its downtrodden football program. Washington won only one game this past season and has dealt with a coaching controversy in recent years. However, it remains a premier spot, one which has made history by having Black men simultaneously run its major conference football and basketball programs. Given his history on the field, Husky fans would be wise to not look upon the 50 year-old coach as its football messiah. If this happens, Willingham, college football’s highest profile Black coach, could be in for a long ride.

Off the field, few major college coaches have academic records as impressive as Willingham. A scholar-athlete at Michigan State, he held head coaching positions at two highly-regarded universities. Stanford has long been ranked among the top 5 or 10 universities by US News & World Report, and Notre Dame is typically in the top 25. At both schools, Willingham’s football teams either continued a pattern of high GPAs and graduation rates, or saw improvements in both.

He was particularly effective – and widely lauded – for his role in raising the classroom and graduation achievements of Black football players to the same levels as their White teammates. In taking the helm of the football program at a Top 50 university, Willingham’s history indicates that the Huskies will be a juggernaut off the field.

Still, the reality is that college football is a business with a bottom line of winning on Saturdays. More wins translates into BCS bowl bids, higher ticket sales, and increased TV revenues. His shortcomings on the field drove his dismissal at Notre Dame, and in this all-important department, the reality of Tyrone Willingham’s coaching record does not quite measure up to the legend that surrounds him.

In ten seasons as a head coach, Willingham compiled a record of 65-51-1 (55.6%), with 6 bowl invitations. He coached in five bowls and won only one, the 1996 Sun Bowl. His 2004 Notre Dame squad earned a sixth invitation, but he won’t be coaching in that game. He’s had one season each with 8, 9, and 10 wins, and he could never put together three consecutive winning seasons. Willingham produced only three top 25 teams, two at Stanford and one at Notre Dame, and his highest poll ranking is 16^th. A Tyrone Willingham team, though competitive, can be expected to go 7-5, receive a bowl invitation and lose.

In the high-stakes game of college football, performing like this is not bad. However, it’s merely above average in a world where that is just not good enough. Two coaches with similar records - Frank Solich and Ron Zook - learned this lesson the hard way. Like him, they were fired while still under contract after leaving far too many alumni, athletic directors, and boosters, under whelmed on Saturday afternoons. Granted, the current Notre Dame program is not the Fighting Irish of Lou Holtz. Still, the programs that Solich and Zook inherited, at Nebraska and Florida respectively, were not on par with the respective dynasties that preceded them.

Fair or not, that’s the nature of the college game - coaches pay the price for underachieving teams. Coach Willingham is well aware of this, and he must do what he can to ensure that his teams are far above average; they must be great.

Washington has a solid football tradition, having won a national championship in 1991 and tied for the Pac-10 title in 2000. Coach Willingham has a good record and high expectations for himself. While the Husky football program is not quite on the level with Michigan, Miami, Ohio State, and yes, Notre Dame, Washington has a strong academic and athletic heritage, along with the resources to compete with those schools. As such, at Washington, Coach Willingham must actually live up to his own legend - on the field.

This time around, producing 7-5 teams with no bowl wins is just not a viable option for him in the Pacific Northwest. He had his shots at Stanford and Notre Dame, and the results were mixed at best. While he won’t be expected to win a national title every year, Coach Willingham must guide his teams to Pac-10 conference titles, BCS bowls, national title games, and high classroom performance.

The man, the myth and the legend must become one. Otherwise, he’ll simply be just another good football coach, not the great coach in whom many high hopes rest.

by Webster Brooks III

December 15, 2004

Introduction

In the pantheon of American history it is rare, if not unprecedented that a people would participate in elections for the purpose of divesting their own community of political power. But that is precisely what happened in the 2004 election wars. Of the thirteen million African-Americans that went to the polls on November 2, eighty-eight percent of them casts ballots for Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry and overwhelmingly supported Democrats in congressional races. When the smoke cleared on November 3, incumbent President George W. Bush had routed Kerry and Republicans were in full command of the Senate and House of Representatives.

For the second consecutive general election, Black America is now confronted with a situation in which it has virtually no leverage to pursue its interest through the Republican Party, and Democrats have been severed from the machinery of executive and legislative power. With Republicans controlling the Senate and the constitutional power to confirm Supreme Court appointments, an already conservative leaning Supreme Court will move further to the right should Bush nominate new justices to the bench. Having placed its votes and hopes with the Democratic Party in 2004, African Americans continued to furnish the means of their own political destruction.

In the aftermath of the election a sense of foreboding and anxiety can be palpably felt on the black street, in the black press and on talk radio. Yet, six weeks after the election, not a single article appeared on the websites of the Congressional Black Caucus, the NAACP, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, the Rainbow/Push Coalition or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, that attempted to explain what happened on Election Day. In times like these Black America deserves an analysis of what may ultimately prove be a defining election for years to come.

Lest we forget, the 2004 campaign opened with two black presidential hopefuls: Rev. Al Sharpton and Ambassador Carol Moseley Braun. With justification, Black voters rejected both candidates. Braun, whose main base of support came from white women, dropped out early and supported Howard Dean in exchange for paying off her campaign debts. Sharpton fared no better. He was trounced in every primary and failed to win enough support to be a power broker at the convention. His primary objective in running was to supplant Jessie Jackson as the party’s “maximum” black leader. That title passed by default to Barack Obama, the Senator-elect from Illinois.

The Sharpton and Braun fiascos, combined with the Republican sweep, raise fundamental questions about the effectiveness of black participation in electoral politics. To what end are we engaged in the political process and how is it serving the cause of black advancement? What do we want and what is achievable? If, as many African-Americans believe, the Democratic Party takes us for granted and our plight is a matter of indifference to Republicans, what must be done to re-position Black America as a political force to be reckoned with?

History and the current circumstances provide Black America with a clear answer to the dilemma of recapturing political power. Simply put, we must take up the banner of independent politics. The 2004 general election marks a decisive turning point for Black America to navigate a new course of action by forging an independent breakaway movement from the cesspool of two-party politics.

Notwithstanding detractors who will rail against Black America bolting into the open space of independent politics, history argues that our most significant victories in overturning slavery and the subsequent struggle for first class citizenship were led by independent black leaders and movements. Necessity not only compels us to forge such a breakaway movement, but the current situation provides an extraordinary opening for black independents to anchor a growing and diverse movement of millions.

In short, a well-organized independent black voting bloc, working with other independent formations and third parties can become an influential force and the balance of power in national politics. In this analysis; “A Long Winter in Black America or a New Beginning,” Low Country examines what happened on Election Day and why the Kerry campaign faltered. “A Long Winter” also explores the future implications of the new Republican majority and the “tanning” of the American electorate. The Black, Hispanic, Asian-American, and Native American vote is profiled. And finally, we look at how the seeds of the new black independent movement are germinating in the tumult of a nation bitterly split along the partisan divide.

Election Overview

Voter participation in the 2004 election was the highest since 1968, when Richard Nixon edged out Hubert Humphrey for president (turnout was 61.9 percent). These two elections shared a common denominator; they both occurred in midst of military conflicts, Vietnam and Iraq. Whereas, the 2000 presidential election was contested on the terrain of who could best maintain the peace and prosperity of the Clinton years, the 2004 elections turned on recession and war. A precarious shooting war in Iraq, lingering uncertainties about the nation’s shaky economy and the undercurrent of moral unrest that surfaced with a vengeance on November 2, made the 2004 elections one of the most pivotal and bitterly contested elections in the past four decades.

In the 2004 elections the number of eligible voters totaled 201.5 million. Approximately 59.6 percent of all registered voters participated in the process compared to 54.7 percent in 2000. In absolute numbers, fifteen million more voters (120.2 million) cast ballots in 2004 than four years ago. The media and defenders of the status quo eagerly declared the turnout as a sign that democracy in America was alive and well again. However, America still ranks relatively low on the index of voter participation of western countries and quite a few “underdeveloped” nations. Higher voter turnout rates in Western Europe can be attributed in large measure to unfettered ballot access to third parties and minor parties. In America, the deck is stacked to maintain the dominance of Democrats and Republicans, and to reward incumbency. In the 2004 elections only 4 of 535 incumbents were defeated in congressional races.

Debunking Myths

The 2004 election torched the myth that heavy voter turnout typically translates into an advantage for Democrats. As early reports filtered in on Election Day indicating heavy turnout and long lines in several states, newsrooms began tilting toward Kerry pulling off the upset. The conventional wisdom was that those who don’t vote are essentially young people, poor people and minorities who are apathetic or think the system doesn’t work for them.

In recent years, voter turnout between blacks and whites has narrowed to less than four percentage points. In 2004, voter turnout in urban centers and on college campuses surged, with many newly registered Black, Hispanic and young voters lighting up the polls. While both the Black and Hispanic vote increased as a percentage of the total vote, turnout for voters under 25, remained at 17 percent of the total vote. Nevertheless, voters under 25 years of age increased by 2.5 million voters compared to the 2000 elections.

Thus a valid question arises: if Black, Hispanic and young voters turned out in larger numbers, how did they impact the election, particularly given the perception that these three subgroups lean toward the Democratic Party?

By Low Country’s estimation, about 7.5 million more Black, Hispanic and young voters participated in the 2004 election than the 2000 race. Kerry won the majority vote of these three subgroups, by a 66-33 percent margin or about 4 million votes. Kerry took 88.5 percent of the black vote, 55 percent of the Hispanic vote and 56 percent of voters between the ages of 18-29 years. When compared to the increase in the number of born again/evangelicals that voted we get a sense of what happened.

The press and political pundits have made the point that in the 2000 and 2004 elections, born again/evangelicals accounted for 25 percent of all Bush voters. Bush received 50.4 million votes in 2000 and 60.6 million votes in 2004. By that logic 15 million born again/evangelicals voted for Bush in 2004 compared to roughly 12 million in 2000. What this tells us is that the net increase of 3 million evangelical voters neutralized three-fourths of the combined increase of Black, Hispanic and young voters for Kerry.

Beyond the strength of the evangelical vote, a question remains as to who the other voters were that comprised the remaining seven and one-half million additional participants in the presidential fray. They were voters from the middle class and rural America that had been turned off by negative campaigning; the influence of special interest groups and those frustrated that neither party was listening to their concerns. Geographically speaking, Bush increased his share of the vote by 4.5 percent in the mid-western rural areas, 4.3 percent in the south, in the west by 4.1 percent and surprisingly in the industrial mid-west by 4.1 percent.

In pre-election poll after pre-election poll, the numbers suggested a slight majority of the American people felt the nation was “headed in the wrong direction.” Most people took that to mean the economy was soft and the Iraqi war was not going well. It appears that’s not what people were trying to say. Maybe what they really meant was that the country’s values and morality were headed in the wrong direction.

Without question, the effect and impact of the war drew more voters back into the fold. There was a real feeling that irrespective of their position on a myriad of issues, there would serious consequences concerning national security matters regardless of which candidate won the election. Anti-war voters were not just against the Iraqi conflict; they thought and still think George Bush is reckless in the saddle and will drag the nation into even wider conflicts in the future. Those supporting the war or the troops that voted for Bush believed Kerry would retreat in Iraq and the Middle East, and the door would be flung open to U.S. interests being challenged in every corner of the globe.

Finally, all indications suggest that the total number of provisional ballots casts across the nation was not included in turnout calculations. From Low Country’s standpoint, the number of provisional ballots casts should be included in all turnout models. Regardless of who received the votes, knowing how many provisional ballots were casts provides a more accurate reflection of the level of participation, particularly concerning the black vote.

A Republican Majority for Years to Come?

One of the most critical issues thrown up by the 2004 elections is the Republican sweep and its long-term implications for Black America. On the surface, the Republican juggernaut in 2004 did not appear to be overwhelming. Bush’s Electoral College margin of 286 to 252 still came down to one state—Ohio. The Republicans gained a 55-44-seat advantage in the Senate, and a 231-200-seat margin in the House of Representatives. But the real story behind the numbers portends a disaster in the making for the Democratic Party—permanent minority party status for decades to come.

Not only did Republicans sweep the White House and Congress, they now hold residency in 28 of 50 governors’ mansions. The GOP also controls a plurality of state legislatures. Of the 100 fastest growing counties in America, Republicans carried an astounding 97 counties. The Republicans’ formidable grip on the South tightened even more as they swept five southern Senate seats and pushed north through the border states of Kentucky and Missouri to threaten Democratic strongholds in the Midwest. Bush held Ohio and Indiana and snatched Iowa back into the GOP column. Although he lost Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, Bush narrowed his margin of defeat from the 2000 elections. The same is true of the vote in America’s cities, a traditional Democratic safe haven. Bush won 45% of the city vote but that represented a ten-percentage point increase over his 2000 tally.

If that’s not enough bad news for Democrats, consider the following. Bush won majorities of white men, white women, evangelicals, couples with children, voters over thirty, voters making more than $50,000, high school voters, college voters and regular churchgoers. Add to that, Bush increasing his share of the Hispanic vote by 10 percentage points (losing the Hispanic vote by a 55-45 margin) and gaining three percentage points among Black voters.

Why John Kerry Lost the Election: A Mediocre Candidate and a Bad Campaign

Ultimately John Kerry lost the presidential race for four reasons: Kerry was not a good candidate and ran a shaky campaign; Kerry suffered a credibility gap on national defense; Kerry was weak on moral/values issues; and the Republicans had a better ground game to turn out the vote. In the final analysis, John Kerry, like his predecessor Al Gore, lost this election in part because he was poor candidate and ran a campaign that left much to be desired. With virtually all the polls indicating that slightly more than half the country felt the war in Iraq was not going well; with President Bush’s administration being the only one in last seventy years to record a net loss of jobs; with forty thousand more Americans losing their health care benefits during Bush’s first term of office; with steep increases in health care costs, prescription drugs and college tuition; with the three billion surplus Bush inherited being converted into a 2 billion deficit, John Kerry was positioned to take the campaign to Bush under extremely favorable conditions.

Even the traditional advantage Republicans have enjoyed the past few elections cycles in fundraising was matched in the 2004 campaign, dollar for dollar by the Kerry camp and the 527 committees that supported Democrats. It should also be pointed out that John Kerry ran behind in vote counts to statewide Democratic candidates for governor and the U.S. Senate in 28 states—not exactly something to write home to mom about. Kerry’s campaign was a den of confusion. Kerry fired his senior campaign staff in the primaries and the general election. Bush’s campaign led by strategist Karl Rove functioned like a well-oiled machine, maintaining disciplined and a consistent campaign message from start to finish.

The Credibility Gap on National Defense

John Kerry’s position on the war in Iraq and the War against Terrorism was tormented from the outset of the primaries through the better part of the general election. He did not come out against the war in Iraq until Howard Dean gained traction as the anti-war candidate in the Democratic primaries. After winning the nomination Kerry’s campaign was indecisive as to whether the spear of their attack would be aimed at the economy or the war. By the time the Democratic convention opened in Boston, Kerry appeared convinced that Iraq and the War on Terrorism would dominate the campaign. Rather than confront Bush head on, he circumnavigated the issue by highlighting his career in Vietnam as the centerpiece of the Democratic convention. Enter the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth.

Kerry was too slow to respond to the “Swift Boat” controversy, which called his credibility and his war record into question. The “Swift Boat” issue undermined his argument that he could wage a smarter more effective war in Iraq and against terrorism. For the majority of the electorate the issue was winning the war, not fighting smarter or with a larger international coalition. In the end Kerry’s stance of Iraq and the war on terror could not overcome the electorates’ historic skepticism of Democrats concerning national security matters. The double-digit lead Bush opened up in September during the Swift Boat controversy proved to be insurmountable.

It wasn’t until the first debate in October that Kerry seemed to find his footing, by making Bush’s mismanagement of the war in Iraq the cutting issue. It was an argument that most Democrats supported, although it placed the party in a difficult position given most Democrats in Congress voted to support the war. For John Kerry it was too little too late.

Moral Issues and the Ban on Gay Marriage

Just a few days after the Supreme Court ordered the halt of the recount in Florida, which catapulted George Bush into the Oval Office, Karl Rove, Bush’s chief strategist made a very interesting observation. Thinking four years ahead, Rove commented that based on the 2000 Census data, if the demographics of the black and Hispanic population continued on the same trend line, they would cast almost 2.5 million more votes in the 2004 general election than in 2000. Rove was right in theory, but the Black and Hispanic voters increased by close to 5.5 million votes.

Rove was searching for a counterweight to match what he perceived as a significant advantage to the Democratic base vote. A few weeks later, Rove estimated that about 4 million Christian evangelicals did not come out in the 2000 race. It was clear then where Rove was headed. With the passage of legislation in Massachusetts allowing for same sex marriage, Rove and the Republicans were handed an issue that the majority of Americans opposed.

Yet Bush was slow to endorse a constitutional amendment to define marriage as between a man and a woman. In January 2004, Rove promised impatient born again Christian leaders that an endorsement would be forthcoming. It finally came on February 24, 2004; nearly two weeks after same-sex couples began lining up for nuptials in San Francisco. When Bush’s Defense of Marriage constitutional amendment was defeated in the Senate, many of the amendments’ opponents celebrated with considerable fanfare. But the skirmish Republicans lost on the constitutional amendment was just the opening battle in a protracted cultural war that will continue for some time to come. By the time the November 2, elections rolled around, gay marriage referenda were on the ballot in 11 states: Georgia, Alabama, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon and Utah. The referenda, while worded differently in some states basically defined marriage as between one man and one woman. Every ballot measure won and in each state voter turnout increased by an average of 4.8 percent.

Democrats suspected that Rove and the GOP orchestrated the gay marriage ballot initiatives, but religious activists dispute the claim. In Michigan, state Sen. Alan Cropsey (R) introduced a bill to ban same-sex marriage in October 2003, and assumed it would have the support of his party. Instead, the Roman Catholic Church in Michigan became the amendment’s main booster, spending nearly $1 million to secure its passage. The Bush campaign enlisted thousands of religious “team leaders” in its canvassing efforts.

In battlegrounds states such as Ohio, scores of clergy members attended legal sessions explaining how they could talk about the election from the pulpit. Hundreds of churches launched registration drives, thousands of churchgoers registered to vote, and millions of voter guides were distributed by Christian and anti-abortion groups. Throughout this process, Rove and his team consulted with the movement’s leaders in weekly conference calls. According to activists in battleground states, however, Christian groups were often out ahead of the campaign. Bush won 79 percent of the 26.5 million evangelical voters and 52 percent of 31 million catholic votes, despite Kerry being a catholic. The ballot referendum in Kentucky could have well been the saving grace for Republican Senator Jim Bunting who ran one of the worse campaigns of the election cycle.

Although the numbers appear to be a good approximation of voting patterns on Election Day, exit polls are somewhat questionable concerning comparative data of how many evangelical and born-again voted because the way pollsters identified these voters changed. Four years ago voters leaving polls were asked: “Do you consider yourself part of the conservative Christian political movement, also known as the Religious Right?” In 2004, the question was changed to: “Would you describe yourself as a born-again or evangelical Christian?” Fourteen percent answered “yes” in 2000 and 23 percent did so in 2004. Polling experts said the 2004 wording virtually assured more affirmative answers.

Democrats Lose the Ground War

Despite the Gore campaign’s problems with the messenger and the message in 2000, the deadlocked election was largely the result of Gore’s campaign manager, Donna Brazille outworking and out maneuvering Karl Rove on the ground. Gore won the popular vote in 2000 by 500,000 votes. Traditionally, Democrats concentrated their efforts to get out the vote by waging an intensive ground war, more often than not because they have not been able to raise as much money as Republicans. By contrast Republicans owned the airwaves, skillfully manipulated images through attack ads and commercials and dominating talk radio circuits. In the 2004 race, Kerry raised more money than his campaign knew how to spend. For the first time Democrats went toe to toe with the GOP television in buys and Kerry still had millions of dollars left that went unspent when the election was over. But this time, the Democrats lost the ground war.

To Karl Rove’s credit, and despite his propensity for arrogance, he was humble enough to learn something from losing the popular vote in the 2000 election. He resolved that by 2004, he would organize a grass roots campaign machine capable of rivaling the Democrats. Rove put together a national organization to get out the vote that organized every precinct across the country down to the block captain level. He not only put together the operation but successfully battlefield tested the system in the 2002, midterms. Republicans ran a unified and well-coordinated campaign, organizing the entire country with an elaborate structure that responded on Election Day. It was a classic example of the old saying that wars are often won before the battle commences.

Democrats, on the other hand heavily relied on their supporting 527’s to do the shoe leather work of canvassing and voter registration. Thus, the national campaign office lacked the degree of coordination that the Republicans had. Moreover, in the Black community, having the 527’s lead the ground war, subverted the traditional tie between local Black Democrats and their base constituency.

Base Vote versus Swing Vote

The 2004 election was not like the 2000 election in that the number of true swing voters was substantially smaller. With the nation so evenly divided between the two parties and no formidable centrist or third party candidate in the race, many who would potentially sit on the fence quickly picked a side. Typically, swing voter focus more on domestic issues. War tends to undermine the soft ground that swing voters stand on. It forces them into one camp or the other: in this case either for or against the war.

The mistake the Kerry campaign made was attempting to politically straddle the fence to appeal to swing voters in an election that was essentially a base vote election. For example, the Democrats most reliable constituency is the black vote. However, the Kerry campaign did not make a strong pitch to the black community until the last thirty days of the election, just the same as Al Gore did in the 2000 election.

The Tanning of the American Electorate

In the 2004 elections, blacks cast 12 percent of the total vote, Hispanics cast 8 percent of the total vote and Asian-Americans cast 7 percent of the total vote, with 2 percent coming from voters identified as other. As demographers continue to refine models for the “browning of America” that predict by the year 2060, America will no longer be a majority white nation, the “tanning” process was reflected in the 2004 elections. Blacks, Hispanics and Asian-Americans cast 30 percent of the total vote.

Democrats carried the majority of voters of these three combined subgroups by a 64-36 percent margin. With the exception of the Black vote that was overwhelmingly a Democratic Party bloc vote, it appears that neither party has a monopoly on voter loyalty from Hispanic and Asian-American voters. This trend of Hispanic and Asian-American voters fairly evenly splitting along partisan lines will likely to hold for some years to come.

Black Vote 2004

The critical nature of the 2004 elections was not lost on African-Americans. Blacks increased their percentage of the total national vote from 10 percent in 2000 to 12.5 percent in 2004 (a 2.5 million vote increase). As was mentioned earlier, Kerry carried 88% of the black vote, Bush captured 11 percent and Ralph Nader appeared on the radar screen with 1 percent of the black vote or about 700,000 tallies.

For the second straight general election increases in the turnout of black voters was offset by higher turnout of other voter sub-groups. In the 2000 elections a little more than 10 million blacks voted, an increase of about 1.2 million voters compared to the 1996 presidential contest. However, the black share of the total remained at 10%. In the 2004 campaign blacks cast 12.5% of the total vote, but the increases in their numbers were also offset by the higher overall turnout that increased by 5 percent.

Black women remained the most loyal subgroup of the Democratic Party. It is noteworthy that while Bush cut into the gender gap, picking up 48 percent of the women’s vote compared to 42 percent in 2000, Kerry almost won almost the same percentage of the black vote as Gore did. This suggests that a significant section of white women and some Hispanic females shifted over to the Republican column, while black women held steady. Historically, more black men have voted Republican compared to black women, and it appears that pattern was maintained in 2004.

The Achilles heel of the Black vote from the standpoint of voting strength dilution and an overall strategic standpoint is that almost 55% of all black voters reside in the Deep South. In the 2004 races, Kerry lost every state in the region. Republicans won Senate contests in North and South Carolina, Florida and Louisiana. Indeed in some of these states, like South Carolina and Louisiana, black voters cast almost 50% of the vote for Kerry and Democratic senatorial candidates, and yet these candidates were defeated in every instance.

This presents a real dilemma for black voters and the Democratic Party—in short what we are witnessing is de-facto black voter nullification. With the south going even more Republican in the 2004 election, the black vote in the south is almost a complete write-off except for down ticket state races, county and municipal elections. In North Carolina the black vote increased from 19% of the total vote in 2002 to 26% in 2004. However this increase was not enough to elect Democrat Erskine Boles to the Senate. South Carolina, with the largest percentage of black voters of any state in America increased it total share of the vote form 22% in 2002 to 30% in 2004, but Republican Jim DeMint defeated Inez Tannenbaum in the senate race.

Increases in black votes as a percentage of the total electorate in the states includes the following: Arkansas went from 11% to 15%. In Virginia, the black vote jumped from 16 percent to 21 percent; Maryland went from 22 percent to 24 percent; Michigan went from 11 percent to 13 percent and in New York, it went from 11 percent to 13 percent. In Ohio, the black share of the total vote went from 9 percent to 10 percent, and in Pennsylvania, it went from 7 percent to 13 percent.

Republicans Making Noise in the ‘Hood

Republicans for the first time made some noise in the black community. Known for their chronic disorganization when it comes to putting Black Republicans on the battlefield, the RNC spearheaded a steering committee of Black Republicans said to have some 60-plus members to throw in the election mix. Their primary role was to counterpunch Democrats in the strategic corridor of Midwestern battleground states. Maryland’s Lieutenant Governor Michael Steele, Ohio’s Black Lieutenant Governor Jeanette Bradley and former U.S. Congressman Julius Caesar (J.C) Watts led the Black Republican effort. Speaking tours were organized that concentrated their fire on Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Ohio.

Introducing another weapon in their arsenal of hardball campaign tactics, Republicans for the first time ran negative campaign ads targeted to black radio markets in the Midwest. Ironically, the focus of their attacks was not John Kerry, but his wife, Theresa Heinz-Kerry. The ads hounded Theresa for not being a black woman, a curious tactic given that she isn’t black, doesn’t look black, nor did she ever claim to be. But she was born and raised in Mozambique, Africa. The narrator of the ads raked Heinz-Kerry over the coals as pretentious rich white woman who couldn’t understand or feel the pain of Black America. While it remains to be seen whether the radio spots were effective, they were clearly designed to create doubt and resentment in the Black community. The ads were run by a shadowy 527 committee based in Washington D.C.

In the critical battleground state of Ohio, Black voters cast 16 percent of their votes for Bush, the second highest percentage in the nation. Black voters also supported the defense of marriage ballot referendum by 60-40 margin. For years, Ohio has been one of the few states that had an authentic Black Republican organization. It is also the only state in America that has two statewide elected Black Republican constitutional officers: State Treasurer J. Kenneth Blackwell and Lieutenant Governor Jeanette Bradley. In New Jersey, Bush captured 17 percent of the Black vote; the highest in the nation. Like Ohio, New Jersey Black Republicans have developed a credible group over the years, particularly in the era when Christy Todd-Whitman served as Governor.

On the Democratic Party side of the ledger, black state Senator Barack Obama cruised to victory over Republican Alan Keyes, becoming the second black U. S. Senator from Illinois in less than a decade. Other newcomers to the Congress included Gwendolynne Moore elected to Wisconsin’s 4th District. Ms. Moore served the Wisconsin State Legislature and worked as a development specialist for the city of Milwaukee. Former Kansas City mayor Emanuel Clever was elected to Missouri’s 5th District. Cleaver served twice as president of the national conference of Black Mayor’s. In the 9th District of Texas, attorney Al Green was elected to Congress. Green earned his law degree from Texas Southern in Houston and served as the branch president of the NAACP in Houston for four years. After being defeating the 2002 mid-terms elections in a race that left a lot of bad blood, former Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney won her seat back in Georgia’s 4th district with an impressive 64 percent share. There are now a total of 40 members in the Black Congressional Caucus.

Asian-American Voters

Asian-American voters make up seven percent of all voters in the United States, but according to one expert, fifty percent of Asian-American citizens do not identify with a party, leaving the group politically fragmented. Like other voting sub-groups, Asian-Americans could be a genuine swing vote, with views in between those of other minorities and white voters; however the lack of party affiliation among individual Asian-Americans is a strategic weakness. Asian-Americans tend not to be heavily targeted in campaigns because only 25 percent of the population votes.

Asian-Americans political influence would be greater if they voted in a bloc, but as one expert pointed out, “that is not the natural order of things, our culture is widespread and our sub-groups are often at odds. For example, Vietnamese people are traditionally more conservative, the Chinese are more liberal.” Asian-Americans also vote on issues rather than along party lines, making it less efficient for any party to spend money on this sub-group. As a result, they are less likely to receive mail or phone calls from either party. As bizarre as it would seem, some rationalize that Asian American are also ignored because they are is not seen as oppressed in American society.

The Hispanic Vote

One of the new realities of the 21st Century is that Hispanics pushed past African-Americans as the largest minority group in America with a population of close to 35 million. However, because large numbers of Hispanics are not U.S. citizens their voting strength does not yet reflect their population count. Driven by three distinct blocks that include, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans and Cuban Americans, the Latino vote in the 2004 elections jumped form 6 percent of the total vote in 2002 to 8 percent of the total vote in 2004. Close to 9 million Hispanic voters went to the polls.

The Hispanic electorate is far from a monolithic voting bloc. Among Cuban-American voters there are not only generational issues, but U.S. relations with Cuba, trade and diplomatic status are hot button issues. Among Mexican-Americans, guest worker policy, immigration, NAFTA and GATT trade issues are dominant. The territorial status of Puerto Rico and citizen opposition to military bases on the island have been issues in the past. Beyond these three blocs of Hispanic voters, increasing number of Latino voters from Central America are adding even more diversity to this burgeoning group.

Both parties contended heavily for the Hispanic vote in 2004. John Kerry carried the majority of the Hispanic vote by a 55-45 margin, but the big story was George Bush’s increase of ten percentage points compared to his share of Latino voters in the 2000 race. One of the principal drivers of Bush’s success was Hispanic Catholics, many of whom are anti-abortion and opposed to gay marriages.

In Arizona, Proposition 200, the “Proof of Citizenship” initiative appeared on the ballot in 2004. Prop 200 required proof of citizenship when registering to vote and evidence of legal residency when applying for state and local government benefits. A narrow majority of Hispanic voters supported Proposition 200, which easily passed with 56 percent of the state vote. The provisions of Prop 200, also calls for jail time for state workers who don’t report illegal immigrants who seek benefits.

Florida served as ground zero of an intense battle for the Hispanic vote. Not above direct involvement in picking candidates in state races, Bush plucked the popular Cuban-born cabinet Secretary of Housing and Human Development, Mel Martinez to run for the open Senate seat in Florida vacated by Democrat Bob Graham. The GOP investment in Martinez paid handsome dividends. His razor thin victory over Betty Castor by 800,000 votes increased the Republican margin in the Senate and helped Bush secure 54% of Hispanic voters in a must-win state to re-capture the White House. Martinez will be joined in the Senate chambers in January by Ken Salazar, the newly elected Hispanic senator from Colorado, who defeated Republican beer baron Pete Coors by a 51-46 spread.

Moving quickly to reward Hispanic voters, George Bush selected Cuban-American Carlos Gutierrez as his nominee for the Secretary of Commerce cabinet post vacated by Don Evans. Alberto Gonzalez, a close friend of Bush from Texas, was also nominated for Attorney General to replace John Ashcroft. With their expanding voter strength as evidenced in the 2004 elections, growing numbers of high profile governmental figures on both sides of the partisan divide and long term projections for significant population increases due to natural birth and immigration patterns, the Hispanic community is emerging as a force to be contended with in American politics.

Native Americans

In the 2004 campaign, the National Congress of American Indians issued a call to register one million new Native American voters. According to census data there are 1.6 million Native Americans of voting age. Native American activists contended that about half of the battleground states in the 2004 election had enough Native American votes to impact the outcome of various races. The majority of registered Native American voters are Democrats. Ben “Nighthorse” Campbell, the Republican senator from Colorado recently retired. Native Americans were 16.1 percent of the voters in Alaska: 9.5 percent of the voters in New Mexico, 7 percent of the voters in South Dakota, 1.8 percent of the voters in Colorado and 1.7 percent of the voters in Utah.

The resurgence of Native American influence in politics centered on it’s efforts to defeat Washington Senator Slade Gordon, dubbed the “Indian Fighter,” whose views were roundly condemned by Native American activists. In the 2000 campaign, Native American activists launched a voter’s registration drive that brought 10,000 new voters onto the voting rolls in Washington state. They conducted education campaigns (First American Education Project) on Gordon’s record and statements, and ran attack ads on television. Gordon lost the election by 2,500 votes. The “Indian Fighter” campaign turned thunder into sheet lightning as activists around the country hailed Gordon’s defeat as a great victory for all Native Americans.

The Native American resurgence has been also been increasingly bankrolled by tribal gaming revenue. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, a campaign finance watchdog, total tribal donations to federal campaigns increased from $1,760 in 1990 to $2.95 million in 2000. In the 2004 campaign Native American activists targeted key races in South Dakota (Thune vs. Daschle), and Alaska (Murkowski vs. Knowles).

Low Country was unable to obtain figures on the success of the 2004 voter registration initiative and projections of Native American turnout. However the efforts of the National Congress of Indian Affairs and the First American Education Project are a part of the growing mix of new forces that are contending on the political battlefield in the 21st Century.

Summary

In the years to come, scholars will likely look back on the 2004 election as a seminal moment in 21st Century American history; not because it signaled the genesis of an American renaissance, or the recovery of our national sense of purpose, or the defeat of a global menace. Rather this election is an exclamation point that marks the transition to a period of profound international upheaval and deepening domestic turmoil.

From the war torn streets of Baghdad, to the unfinished Russian revolution, from the turbulent battles on the West Bank to the veiled nuclear intrigue unfolding in North Korea, the flashpoints of global crisis are smoldering. And while “The War on Terrorism” and the Bush doctrine of pre-emption masquerades as the sum total of U.S. foreign policy, it is but a matter of time before the looming conflict with China invites a maximum crisis that could usher in a new world order.

On the home front, the economy is increasingly saddled with deficits, foreign and national debt, not to mention the slide of the dollar in international markets. In the aftermath of September 11, Bush’s tax cuts have failed to jump start a sluggish economy and soft job market. Although the economy is not likely to lapse into a serious recession it could stagnate for extended periods of slow growth, thus giving rise to simmering disenchantment. Under these conditions, the forty year window of relative domestic tranquility may give way to increased polarization as the partisan divide deteriorates into an ever more balkanized society.

The real vulnerability of the economy resides in the fact that it is so heavily interwoven into the global marketplace. Any severe international shock like that of 911, (for example the collapse of the Saudi royal family) could throw the economy in chaos overnight. In Low Country’s view, a scenario like this is not beyond the realm of possibility during the next four years.

It is against this backdrop that the 2004 elections must be viewed. After everything is said and done, neither party offered serious solutions to the extraordinary challenges this nation faces. Thus, there is a leadership vacuum not only in the black community but the entire body politic. As free-thinking black independents there was never a more opportune moment for us to mount the political stage for the purpose providing political direction for Black America and by extension the nation as a whole. The Democratic Party and the civil rights establishment are in disarray, and have no agenda to move our community forward. We must not confuse or misconstrue the fact that 88% percent of Black voters supported Kerry and the Democrats as a rationale that Black America’s support for Democrats is steadfast. Nor will a decisive bloc of Black voters gravitate toward the Republican Party.

What a sizable section of the Black electorate is waiting for is a viable alternative. If Ross Perot could win 8 percent of the Black vote in 1992, then Black independents can certainly compete at a very high level within and outside our community. It falls to black independents to forcefully argue that political impotency and irrelevance is no longer an option for Black America. We possess boundless talent, energy and moral courage that must be liberated from the suffocating weight of mediocrity and the nostalgia of an era gone by. There is no political precedent for our tasks to lead an independent political movement. Clearly, we are charting new waters. But history has provided many valuable lessons to guide our enterprise. Should we refuse to learn from history, then we are not only bound to repeat the mistakes of the past, but history will hold our generation in contempt, and rightfully so. Let the 2004 elections be the start of a new beginning.

2004 Election Exit Polls (source: CNN)

Vote by Race Bush Kerry

White (77%) 58% +4 41%

Black (12%) 11% +2 88%

Latino (8%) 45% +10 53%

Asian (2%) 44% +3 56%

Other (2%) 40% +1 54%

Vote by Gender

Male (46%) 55% +2 41%

Female (48%) 48% +5 51%

Vote by Age

18 - 29 (17%) 45% 54%

30 - 44 (29%) 53% +4 46%

45 - 59 (30%) 51% +2 48%

60 Plus (24%) 54% +7 46%

Vote by Income

Under $15,000 (8%) 36% 63%

$15-30,000 (15%) 42% 57%

$30-50,000 (22%) 49% 50%

$50-75,000 (23%) 56% 43%

$75-100,000 (14%) 55% 45%

$100-150,000 (11%) 57% 42%

$150-200,000 (4%) 58% 42%

$200,000 Plus (3%) 63% 35%

Vote by Religion

Protestant (54%) 59% +3 40%

Catholic (27%) 52% +5 47%

Jewish (3%) 25% +6 74%

Other (7%) 23% +5 74%

Have You Ever Voted Before?

No (11%) 46% +3 53%

Yes (89%) 51% +3 48%

Vote by Ideology

Liberal (21%) 13% 85%

Moderate (45%) 45% 54%

Conservative (34%) 84% 15%

Are You A Union Member

Yes (14%) 38% 61%

No (86%) 54% 45%

By Damon Banks

December 15, 2004

New Haven, CT - History is replete with false prophets, whose irrational divinations enraptured thousands of devoted followers. However, when those predictions failed to manifest, time and again the disillusioned congregations disbanded, and the prophets faded from public life forever in disgrace. I saw more false prophecy at work in this years Presidential election, in many African-Africans who envisioned an apocalypse if George W. Bush won a second term. In fact, just before the election one black colleague lamented, a [Bush] victory would be the beginning of the end of this country.”

Yet this was a logical conclusion of an electorate inculcated in fear by a flock of Chicken Littles — the so-called black leadership — who spent the past year characterizing Republicans as racists. With the election so close, Democrats lived or died by black voter fealty; so they swapped their tickets hope on the way theme for the sky is falling.” Thus instead of courting black voters with new ideas or an appealing candidate, Democrats secured them through panic.

I watched, as Democrat surrogates in black leadership leveled unsubstantiated attacks against the GOP — including one from NAACP Chairman Julian Bond accusing Republicans of appealing to the dark underside of American culture, to that minority of Americans who reject democracy and equality.” Reverend Jesse Jackson helped amplify those discrimination fears this fall, when he joined Senator Kerry on the campaign trail. Evoking the specter of 2000s minority voter disenfranchisement, Jackson declared we will not stand idly by while African-Americans are intimidated, turned away from the polls, or effectively disenfranchised in any way.”

And just in case any black voter dare stray, the fear-mongering piece de resistance: a reprehensible flier, circulated by the group America Coming Together, equating alleged African-American voter intimidation to Bull Connors water-hoses. (Nevermind that Bull Connor, Birmingham’s infamous segregationist police commissioner, was a Democrat.) According to this October’s Joint Center Survey, the Democrats strategy was effective. 67% of blacks had an unfavorable view of President Bush (over 20% higher than the general population). And as if Katherine Harris would swoop down and devour their ballots, a staggering 63% of blacks thought their votes might not count this election.

African-Americans were convinced their rights, personal freedoms, and well-being depended on this elections outcome. Droves of black voters turned out to crusade for their basic civil liberties — to battle against the Republican-orchestrated demise of the world. But when the dust settled, President Bush won this election. More importantly, millions of blacks had freely voted. And the sky was well still up. In the aftermath, I found many African-Americans dejected. The brute look in their eyes, treachery that 11% of us blacks, according to exit polls, voted for Bush. But that anger at me belied a greater disillusionment with the black leadership.

Their prophecy was debunked. Bush won; African-Americans voted. Civil rights remained. And now the whole black Democrat raison d’etre was shaken. So while pundits kibitz on the future of the floundering Democrat party, they may overlook another intriguing development: namely, the long-term repercussions of Bush’s victory on the African-American electorate. Because when the seditious fog burns off, I’m optimistic more blacks will see what I see — that this administration hasn’t enslaved them, but championed them with education reforms, vouchers, incredible faith-based initiative funding, and prominent representation in this Republican Presidents racially diverse cabinet. They may recognize that Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and Rod Paige aren’t sell-outs or traitors, but legitimate brokers of political alternatives for our race.

As more rank-and-file blacks diffuse, like so many other false prophets, the age of the black Democrat demagogue may finally be over. No doubt, African-Americans will rest easier, and be better served by a President and party concerned more with minority achievement than allegiance.

The author is a graduate student at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut.

By Conaway B. Haskins III

Black Athlete Sports Network, December 12, 2004

As the 2004 NFL season comes to a close, it would be wise for the sports world to reflect on the status of black coaches at football’s highest level. Given the recent controversies in the college game that have raised the ire of black coaches and their allies, we should all take a step back and examine an interesting fact of NFL coaching life - the clear success of black coaches in terms of wins and losses.

Art Shell made history in 1989 when Al Davis promoted him to head coach after his long tenure as a player and coach with the team. Shell was followed into the NFL by Dennis Green, Ray Rhodes, Tony Dungy, Herman Edwards, Marvin Lewis and, the newest member of the coaching fraternity, Lovie Smith.

Let us not forget current Browns coach, Terry Robiskie, he being the man who’s been asked to finish out the seasons of two different fired coaches. In my mind, Ray Rhodes should receive special recognition as the first black man to be hired for a head coaching spot after being fired from one, thus starting a black coach reemployment trend that has extended to Tony Dungy and Dennis Green.

Aside from their membership in the black race, one other important fact unites them all. As a group, these men have won a higher percentage of their games than the NFL average coach, typically a white coach. According to the latest data, there have been 255 men who have coached NFL-level teams. This includes the AFL, which merged with the NFL in the 1970 after serving as a rival to the league for players and media attention. Of course, there were many coaches who worked in the league before 1950, but the most accurate statistics cover the last 50 years.

Overall, the NFL’s coaches have achieved an overall record of 10,456-10,207-348 in regular season games, and a 390-390 playoff record. Out of those 255, only eight African Americans (3.1% of the total) have risen through the ranks to reach the head coach spot. Entering Week 14’s games, the NFL’s black coaches have achieved an overall regular season record of 331-255-1 (56.4%). Over a combined total of 40 full seasons, they have guided their teams to 21 playoff appearances in 32 full seasons, for a 12-21 record or 36.4%.

Despite these not-so-great post-season win totals, black coaches have appeared in 5 conference championship games since 1989, coming close to Super Bowl berths on several occasions. In comparison, the 246 White men who have coached NFL teams are 10,028-9, 865-346. This pans out to a regular season winning percentage of 49.5%. White coaches do fare better in the playoffs with a combined 371-367 record (50.3%), which is logically in line with the average playoff performance since there is a 1 to 1 win-loss ratio.

Essentially, this indicates that, on balance, a white coach has only a 50-50 shot at having a winning record. But, a Black coach is more likely than not to win more games than he loses. It is not my intent to demonstrate that black men are better coaches than white men, but the evidence does show that the ability of African-American to win in the NFL is clear.

Despite this, only 12 teams in history have given a black man a chance to be their head coach, and only 10 have actually hired black men as head coaches (Robiskie was twice brought on as an assistant and promoted in-season). If Vince Lombardi was right about winning being the only thing that matters, then NFL teams should open up the flood gates to welcome black coaching talent.

On the contrary, the league has had to institute a policy that essentially forces NFL teams who are looking for new coaches to pay lip service, at a minimum, to black candidates. While this action does have some residual benefits in terms of raising the profile of selected black prospects league-wide and giving them the opportunity to gain key interview experience, it hasn’t yet produced a flood of hires, say, on par with the NBA.

In my mind, and according to their data, no one can really make any other argument for why there aren’t more black coaches in the NFL other than to site the lingering effects of historical discrimination and the continuing presence of institutional racism with the NFL’s team executive suites. Given that the NCAA is down to 2 black coaches, bringing candidates up through that pipeline is probably not a great option. Plus, given the recent history of coaches who tried to make the transition from the college game to the pro ranks (e.g. Steve Spurrier, Butch Davis, etc.), this is probably not a bad thing.

While Paul Tagliabue and the NFL’s executive team must be commended for taking progressive steps toward opening up opportunity for black coaches through its Minority Coaching Fellowship and other efforts, the leagues’ team owners should be continuously taken to task for not sealing the deal with hiring black coaches.

After all, if the worst thing that can happen is that the brother turns out to be average, the records show that it’s not so bad after all.